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The Applicability of the Constitutional Privilege to.
Defame: Question of Law or Question of Fact?
Commentators have long decried the law of defamation as one of
the most complex and frequently irrational areas of tort law.' Most
agree that it has been frequently abused, and, as a consequence, it
has suffered periods of disfavor.2 One of its most unattractive fea-
tures is its obvious conflict with freedom of expression.3 The com-
mon law of defamation, however, provided a mechanism for balanc-
ing the competing interests of freedom of speech and press against
the need for protection from reputational harm. This was accom-
plished through the recognition of various privileges,4 which pro-
vided the speaker or publisher with some degree of immunity from
liability for defamatory statements where the private or public in-
terest in the communication was considered to outweigh the reputa-
tional interests of the defamed individual.5
' See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRs § 111, at 737-39 (4th ed. 1971).
2 Id.
3 Id.
The common law of defamation recognized numerous privileges. Although they varied
somewhat among jurisdictions, they fell into three identifiable categories. First, certain very
narrowly defined statements, in which the interests of unfettered speech were clearly para-
mount, were recognized as absolutely privileged. Absolute privileges protected, for example,
the statements of participants in judicial proceedings, and of legislative and executive officers
of government. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.22-.23 (1956);
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114.
Other statements, in which the interest in free speech was less compelling, were recognized
as conditionally privileged. Conditional privileges were recognized where a substantial inter-
est of the speaker, a third party, a group, or the public in communicating or receiving the
information justified the risk of defamatory harm. Examples of statements conditionally
privileged are those made in an effort to collect a debt or recover stolen property; communica-
tions made to an employer about the conduct of an employee or by a member of a business
entity to another member about business affairs; and statements made to a public officer who
has authority to take action in furtherance or protection of the public interest. See generally
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, § 5.25-.26; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 115.
Finally, a significant number of jurisdictions recognized a privilege of fair comment or
privileged criticism. This privilege applied to speech on matters of public interest including
statements about public officials and candidates, public institutions, objects of art and sci-
ence, and persons who in some way offer their conduct or product to the public for approval.
See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, § 5.28.
5 While the absolute privileges provided total immunity from liability for defamation, the
conditional privileges could be defeated and the defendant held liable upon proof that the
defamatory statement had been published with "actual malice" (spite or ill-will) or in fur-
therance of interests different from those which the privilege was created to protect. See
generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 4, § 5.27; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 115, at
792-96.
Fair comment was limited in a majority of jurisdictions to the protection of defamatory
opinion based on true underlying facts. A minority of states, however, included within the
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In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, I the United States Supreme
Court found that the common law privileges offered constitutionally
inadequate protection of the first amendment interests of free
speech and press.' In that case, the Court established a constitu-
tional privilege which shielded a publisher from liability for defama-
tory statements concerning the official conduct of a public official
unless the statements were made with knowledge or reckless disre-
gard of their falsity.8
Since New York Times, the Court and many commentators have
become embroiled in controversy concerning the proper scope of the
constitutional privilege.9 Little has been written, however, about the
proper roles for the judge and the jury in deciding whether the
protection of fair comment defamatory falsehood contained in criticism of public officials and
prominent private persons published with a reasonable belief in their truth. Under either
view, fair comment did not include defamatory statements concerning purely private matters
which had no bearing on the public aspects of the individual's character or behavior. See
generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 4, § 5.28.
- 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
' The Court found that the privilege.of fair comment, as recognized in Alabama law, offered
inadequate protection for criticism of public officials because it provided that the privilege
applied only to criticism based on true statements of fact. The Court discussed with approval
the case of Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908), which represented the
innority view that the privilege applied also to defamatory falsehood if published with a
reasonable belief in its truth. 376 U.S. at 278-81.
376 U.S. at 279-80.
The Court's decisions since New York Times are, in chronological order: Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966); Curtis Publishing co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Beckley Newspapers Corp.
v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970);
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971);
Oscala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S.Ct. 2675 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979). In all of these cases the Court focused its attention on the
proper scope of the constitutional privilege. For those cases in which the scope of the privilege
was significantly expanded or contracted, see notes 13-18 & accompanying text infra.
The cases have elicited an avalanche of law review articles. Some of the most recent and
comprehensive articles include: Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tax. L. REV.
422 (1975); Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy Making, 61
MINN. L. REV. 645 (1977); Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years
of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, The
American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analyti-
cal Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 Ru'r.-CAM. L.J. 471
(1975); Green, Political Freedom of the Press and the Libel Problem, 56 TEx. L. REV. 341
(1978); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 Tax. L. REV. 1221 (1976); Robert-
son, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx.
L. REV. 199 (1976).
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privilege applies in a particular case,'0 and some lower court deci-
sions reflect a growing uncertainty and apparent conflict regarding
those functions." A resolution of this confusion and conflict is par-
ticularly urgent in light of the importance of the first amendment
interests involved and the practical recognition that the question
whether the privilege applies will often be the dispositive issue in
the case.
12
This note will explore the question whether the applicability of
the constitutional privilege is a question of fact for the jury or a
question of law for the judge. The note will begin with a brief sum-
mary of the public official and public figure standards which define
the present scope of the privilege. It will then examine the scant
guidance the Court has offered on the proper roles for the judge and
jury in applying these standards, and consider how lower courts
confronting the question have interpreted these words of guidance.
Finally, it will analyze these interpretations in light of the policies
underlying the constitutional privilege and offer a proposal for the
proper treatment of the privilege issue.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AND THE Rosenblatt COURT
The Privilege
In the years following the Court's New York Times decision, the
constitutional privilege initially underwent considerable expansion
in scope.' 3 First, the Court extended the privilege to include defama-
,0 The Court has addressed the issue directly only once. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 88 (1966). For discussion of the case, see notes 24-33 & accompanying text infra. One
commentator has discussed the question of judge and jury roles in deciding whether a defama-
tory statement is relevant to the "official conduct" of a public official. Comment, The Ex-
panding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from Liability for Defamation: Pre-
dictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547, 1552-55 (1972).
See notes 42-53 & accompanying text infra.
12 Upon application of the constitutional privilege, a plaintiff must show by "clear and
convincing proof" that the defendant published the allegedly defamatory statement with
knowledge or in reckless disregard of its falsity. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 30 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). Moreover,
summary judgment has been deemed by some courts as particularly appropriate in cases
where the plaintiff cannot make a strong showing that he will be able to meet this high burden
of proof. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1011 (1967). As a result, very few actions are successful if the constitutional privilege
is held applicable and the finding of the privilege becomes the "paramount issue" in the case.
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); see Eaton,
supra note 9, at 1375.
11 Even before expansion of the privilege by the Court, lower courts found New York Times
to authorize application of the privilege in a broad range of cases. See Eaton, supra note 9,
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tion of public figures 4 as well as public officials; finally a plurality
of the Court expanded it to include even defamation of private
individuals involved in matters of "public or general interest."' '5 In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,'6 however, a new majority expressed
concern that the expansion of the privilege under the public interest
rationale threatened to defeat the valid reputational interests of
private individuals." With these concerns in mind, the majority
chose to reconfine the scope of the privilege to protect only defama-
tion of public officials and public figures.' 8
The present public official and public figure standards contain
two basic elements." The first element focuses on the status of the
individual. To be deemed a public official for the purposes of the
privilege, an individual must occupy a governmental position of
sufficient public importance to warrant "independent interest in
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it. ' 20
at 1376-77. Commentators also found the first amendment theory underlying the Court's
opinion in New York Times to support a much broader privilege than that announced in the
narrow holding of the case. See, e.g., Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment:
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267.
" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). For comment on the case see Kalven,
supra note 13.
11 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). For analysis of the five opinions
written in the case see Keeton, Some Implications of the Constitutional Privilege to Defame,
25 VAND. L. REV. 59 (1972).
" 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, argued that private individuals were less likely
than public officials or public figures to have sufficient access to media channels to effectively
rebut a defamatory falsehood and thereby minimize its adverse effects and, more impor-
tantly, private individuals could not be considered to have voluntarily placed themselves in
a position which invited public attention. He also argued that the subject matter test of
Rosenbloom, by committing the determination of what was a "matter of public interest" to
the ad hoc decision of judges, subjected publishers to strict liability for defamatory error
should a judge in a particular case find the subject matter unrelated to an issue of public
interest. Id. at 344-46.
" The majority expressly approved the application of the constitutional privilege to defam-
atory statements concerning public officials and public figures. Id. at 343. In order to protect
first amendment interests in cases involving private individuals, the Court chose the radical
step of reshaping defamation law at its roots, abolishing strict liability for defamatory false-
hoods and limiting recovery to actual damages unless knowledge or reckless disregard of
falsity has been proved. Id. at 347-50.
" Some commentators have pointed out that Gertz may be read as a total rejection of the
use of subject matter considerations as a basis for applying the privilege, and that the pre-
Gertz requirement that the subject matter of the defamatory statement relate to the public
aspects of the public official's or public figure's character or activities may no longer be a
part of the privilege. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 9, at 1443-46. This seems an unlikely reading
of the Court's intention and in fact contradicts the Court's proposition that most public
figures will become so only "for a limited range of issues." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418-
U.S. 323, 351 (1974). In the discussion to follow, the standard is treated as retaining the
second subject matter element.
20 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). The Court stated that such "independent
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The standard by which a private individual may be deemed a public
figure is considerably more complex. In most cases, an individual
will become a public figure only if he has voluntarily injected him-
self into a particular public controversy in order to influence its
resolution."' The second element necessary for application of the
privilege is that the defamatory statement refer to the individual in
his public capacity. In the case of a public official, the statement
must refer to his official conduct or be relevant to his fitness for
office.22 In the case of a public figure, the statement must relate to
that limited range of issues with respect to which he has been
deemed a public figure.?
Rosenblatt v. Baer
With only one exception, the United States Supreme Court has
decided the applicability of the constitutional privilege in the case
interest" must be "beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance
of all government employees," id., and "entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion
occasioned by the particular charges in controversy," id. at 86-87 n.13. Although this restric-
tive definition was generally disregarded in the years of the privilege's expansion, see note 13
supra, it seems likely that courts will return to a more literal reading of the standard in light
of the Court's opinion in Gertz. See Eaton, supra note 9, at 1446-48.
21 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). The Court's full definition was
somewhat broader:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary
public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this
status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures
have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
Id. at 345.
The Court's new definition of the public figure standard has been found an enigma by lower
court judges attempting to apply it. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Defining public figures
is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall."). At least one commentator has found that
the definition "answers few questions and creates a host of new ones." Eaton, supra note 9,
at 1419.
22 In New York Times, the Court announced that the privilege applied to allegedly defama-
tory statements concerning the "official conduct" of public officials but declined to further
define the term. 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964). The same year, however, the concept was
expanded to include "anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office." Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). Under this formulation the Court has found that "as a
matter of constitutional law. . . a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time
or place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fitness for office." Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971). Like the public official standard, it is possible
that this concept will shrink in scope in the aftermath of Gertz.
" See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
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before it as a matter of law. In Rosenblatt v. Baer,24 however, the
Court refrained from deciding the issue of the plaintiffs status as a
public official and offered its only explicit guidance on the proper
roles of the judge and jury on the privilege issue.
In Rosenblatt, the Court reviewed a judgment granted the former
manager of a county owned ski area for an alleged libel contained
in a newspaper article on the area's financial condition. The Court
found that the evidence in the trial record raised at least a substan-
tial argument that the plaintiff was a public official within the
meaning of New York Times.2 However, since the trial had been
held before the New York Times decision, and had failed directly
to address the public official issue, the Court chose to remand the
case without deciding the question itself. In its instructions to the
trial court on remand, the Court stated:
The record here, however, leaves open the possibility that
respondent could have adduced proofs to bring his claim outside
the New York Times rule. Moreover, even if the claim falls
within New York Times, the record suggests respondent may be
able to present a jury question of malice as there defined. Be-
cause the trial here was had before New York Times, we have
concluded that we should not foreclose him from attempting
retrial of his action. We remark only that, as is the case with
questions of privilege generally, it is for the trial judge in the
first instance to determine whether theproofs show respondent
to be a "public official. ",2,
Further guidance is given in the Court's footnote to this passage.
The Court begins the note with a citation to treatise sections and
section 619 of the Restatement of Torts, which deal with the func-
tions of judge and jury in deciding questions of common law condi-
tional privileges." The clear implication of the citation is that lower
courts may refer to the rules of common law for guidance in deter-
mining which issues are for the judge and which are for the jury in
constitutional privilege cases. The cited authorities uniformly state
that the question whether the privilege applies is a question for the
court, while the question whether the defendant acted in such a way
as to defeat the privilege is a question for the jury.2 Following its
citation to these authorities, the Rosenblatt Court offered an ex-
24 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
21 Id. at 87.
2 Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 88 n.15.
2 F. HARPER & F. JAas, supra note 4, § 5.29, at 466-67; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 115,
at 796; REsTATEM Nr OF ToRTs § 619 (1938).
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planation of what was to be achieved by the use of these rules,
proposing that "[s]uch a course will both lessen the possibility that
a jury will use the cloak of a general verdict to punish unpopular
ideas or speakers, and assure an appellate court the record and
findings required for review of constitutional decisions. 2 9
While the language and authorities cited by the majority seem to
stress a prominent role for the judge on the privilege issue, Justice
Black, in a separate opinion, chose to emphasize the fact that jury
issues may be present on the privilege question. He expressed his
fear that "the words 'in the first instance' will soon be forgotten"
and that "[w]hen that happens the rule will be that the Federal
Constitution forbids States to let juries decide essentially jury ques-
tions in libel cases."3 0 Justice Black's comments are difficult to
decipher since he consistently maintained that the constitutional
privilege was inadequate because it allowed a jury to punish un-
popular speech by a finding of knowledge or reckless disregard of
falsity." Justice Black, however, was as vehement in his defense of
the American jury as he was in his defense of the first amendment
as an absolute bar to any governmental infringement on the free-
doms of speech and press. 2 Notwithstanding the apparent inconsis-
tency of his position, Black's Rosenblatt opinion has been cited by
courts concerned that the jury's role in constitutional privilege cases
not be completely eroded.3
THE PRIVILEGE ISSUE IN LOWER COURTS
Nearly all courts which have faced the issue cite Rosenblatt as
authority when deciding whether the privilege issue is for the court
as a question of law or for the jury as a question of fact.34 Although
the authority remains constant, the results are far from uniform.3 5
In fact, it seems that from the very beginning the Rosenblatt dicta
3 383 U.S. at 88 n.15.
Id. at 96.
, See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., joined by Doug-
las, J., concurring and dissenting); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967)
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 79-80 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
3' See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 401-05 (1964) (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting).
" See, e.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 862 n.8, 330 N.E.2d
161, 170 n.8 (1975); Baer v. Rosenblatt, 108 N.H. 368, 370, 237 A.2d 130, 132 (1967).
, See cases cited notes 36, 42 & 52 infra.
See notes 42-53 & accompanying text infra.
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failed to give clear guidance to lower courts on the proper treatment
of the public official/public figure issue.
The inadequacy of the Court's instructions in Rosenblatt is best
illustrated by the history of the case on remand." At the original
trial of the case, the defendant argued that the alleged defamation
was privileged public criticism, and introduced considerable evi-
dence on the history of public comment and controversy concerning
the operation of the ski area and the persons in charge of it.7 On
remand, the defendant sought a ruling by the court on the public
official status of the plaintiff solely on the basis of this evidence,
since the plaintiff had not offered additional evidence on the public
official issue .38 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, however, found
that the plaintiff was "entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether
he was a public official. 139 The ruling of the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court seems to indicate that a jury issue was present because
conflicting inferences could be drawn about the plaintiff's status as
a public official under the standard announced by the United States
Supreme Court.10 Under this approach, the status of the plaintiff as
a public official or public figure, like any other factual issue, would
be sent to the jury in cases where reasonable minds might differ on
its proper resolution.
For some years after the Rosenblatt case, the question of the
proper treatment of the privilege issue received little attention. Dur-
ing those years, the privilege was undergoing its period of expansion,
and the threshold question in the application of the privilege was
not the status of the defamed individual, but rather the public
interest value of the subject matter of the defamatory statement.4
36 Baer v. Rosenblatt, 108 N.H. 368, 237 A.2d 130 (1967).
3' See Brief for Petitioner at 3-10, 14-16, 29-30, Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
108 N.H. at 369, 237 A.2d at 131.
3, Id. at 371, 237 A.2d at 133. Quoting the RESTATEMENT OF ToRS § 619 and the other
authorities cited in the United States Supreme Court opinion, the New Hampshire court
concluded that the status of the plaintiff as a public official depended "on facts not yet
found." Id. The court gave little indication as to just what "facts" these might be, stating
only that the plaintiff's responsibility for the general financial transactions and management
of the ski area, was insufficient to establish that his position invited public scrutiny and
discussion independent of that caused by the alleged defamation. Id. at 370, 237 A.2d at 132.
40 While the plaintiff did dispute the defendant's assertion that the plaintiffs position and
the controversy surrounding it called for application of the public official status, the plaintiff
had not come forward with his own evidence on his position, duties and the public interest
in the operation of the ski resort to counter the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
41 The issue of whether the defamatory statement was on a matter of public interest and
therefore privileged was uniformly decided by courts as a matter of law. See, e.g., Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972). This treatment was the one adopted by the
Restatement. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 618 (1938). A few states have retained the public
interest test as the basis for the application of the privilege as a matter of state law. See
[Vol. 55:389
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However, with the return to the status-based privilege announced
by the Court in Gertz, the question of the proper treatment of the
privilege issue and the meaning of the Court's Rosenblatt dicta have
received attention once again.
In the increasing number of cases in which the issue is addressed,
a majority of courts hold that the status of the plaintiff as a public
official or public figure is a question of law to be decided by the
court.42 Although some courts reach that conclusion with little diffi-
culty,4" others express considerable uncertainty in treating the
plaintiff's status as a question for the court."
While no court has explicitly held that the plaintiff's status as a
public official or public figure is a question of fact, a few courts seem
to treat the issue as a fact question. In Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise
Park Corp.," for example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed a
summary judgment which had been granted in favor of the defen-
dant and remanded the case for development "on a full trial re-
cord," concluding that there was a "genuine issue of fact whether
any of the plaintiffs were public figures."" Similar language appears
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975); Aafco Heating &
Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580
(1974). In Walker, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the determination of what is a
matter of public interest is a question of law for the court. 188 Colo. at 102, 538 P.2d at 459.
42 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1977), affl'd, 578
F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd,
579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979); Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977), affl'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979); cf. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411
F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), affl'd, 580 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1978) (status of plaintiff is a mixed
question of law and fact but is nevertheless for the court and not the jury); Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 910 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (same).
42 See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979).
11 See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (concluding that the
cases "appear to authorize" the court to determine the public figure issue even though it
involved resolution of a mixed question of fact and law); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises,
Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting conflict on the issue and deciding only that in
that case," where the undisputed facts admit to but one conclusion," the trial court properly
decided the issue on motion for spmmary judgment).
" 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975).
" Id. at 541, 543 P.2d at 1369. The court's review of the record does not indicate that any
of the objective facts in evidence concerning the plaintiffs' activities and speech were con-
tested; rather, the court stressed that the evidence was insufficient for resolution of the public
figure issue. Id. at 539-41, 543 P.2d at 1367-69. A finding that the evidence was insufficient
for a favorable ruling on defendant's summary judgment motion is not necessarily inconsist-
ent with treatment of the issue as a matter of law, since such a ruling could be interpreted to
mean only that further development of the underlying facts is necessary before the court can
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in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.47 In dis-
cussing the public figure issue on a defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the District of Columbia federal district court seems to
treat the issue as it would any other factual issue, stating that
"view[ed] . . . in the light most favorable to plaintiff . . . all
reasonable jurors would agree that Martin Marietta Corporation is
a public figure under the standard set out in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc."48
The Supreme Court of Montana, however, has taken the most
novel approach to the issue. In Madison v. Yunker, 49 the Montana
court reversed a summary judgment for a libel defendant and re-
manded the case for trial.s0 Anticipating that the defendant might
raise the constitutional privilege, the court commented that
"[w]hatever the plaintiff's status, it is a question for the jury to
determine, because of the [Montana] constitutional provision that
the jury under instructions of the court is the judge of both law and
fact [in libel cases]. 51
Finally, at least one court has held that the question of the defam-
atory statement's relevance to the plaintiff's public status may pre-
sent a factual issue for jury resolution. In Foster v. Laredo Newspa-
decide the issue. However, by referring to the public figure issue as presenting a "genuine
issue of fact" the court seems to authorize resolution of the issue by the jury should the
evidence remain so inconclusive that reasonable minds might differ as to whether plaintiffs
were public figures.
:7 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
" Id. at 954.
- Mont. -, 589 P.2d 126 (1978).
10 The trial court had granted summary judgment on the basis of a Montana retraction
statute which required a demand for retraction as a prerequisite to an action for libel. The
Montana Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Montana constitutional guaran-
tees that its "courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded to
every injury of character." Id. at -, 589 P.2d at 131.
5, Id. at -, 589 P.2d at 133. What weight should be given to the court's dicta is question-
able. The question of the constitutional privilege and its proper treatment was certainly not
a question directly before it, nor does it seem that the issue had even been developed below.
Furthermore, the comment is directly contrary to a previous holding of the court in a case
where the privilege issue was directly before it. In Manley v. Harer, 82 Mont. 30, 36, 264 P.2d
937, 939-40 (1928), the Montana Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the constitutional
provision that in an action for libel the jury shall determine the law as well as the facts, the
question whether the alleged libelous communication is privileged or not is one for determina-
tion by the trial court as one of law.
Four other states have similar constitutional provisions making the jury the judge of both
law and fact in libel cases. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 5; WYo. CONST. art. I, § 20. In all these states except South Dakota, courts have
nevertheless held that the applicability of a privilege in a libel case is for the judge as a
question of law. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975);
Sullivan v. Strahorn-Hutton-Evans, 156 Mo. 268, 53 S.W. 912 (1899); Adams v. Frontier
Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976). (No South Dakota case on point was found.).
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pers, Inc.,52 the Texas Supreme Court, in reversing a summary judg-
ment granted for the defendant newspaper, found that a factual
issue existed whether the allegedly defamatory article related to the
plaintiff s official conduct or fitness for office. Citing Rosenblatt, the
court pointed out that while the privilege issue was for the court in
the first instance, "the trial court may submit to the jury fact issues
relating to the existence of the privilege."53
CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING
THE PROPER TREATMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE ISSUE
This confusion and conflict about whether the applicability of the
constitutional privilege is a matter of fact or law is clearly at odds
with the United States Supreme Court's expressed intention that
the first amendment interests involved be protected by a federal
rule which provides "national constitutional protection" free from
variation among jurisdictions. 4 Indeed, since the press is increas-
52 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977). The plaintiff, who was
both a private consulting engineer engaged by the county to work on a local flooding problem
and the elected county surveyor, brought a libel action against a newspaper which had
published an article concerning the controversy surrounding the flooding problem. The article
included the erroneous statement that the plaintiff had platted the housing subdivision where
the flooding problems were most severe.
m Id. at 816 n.10. The Texas Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was not a public figure
as a result of his involvement as a consulting engineer in the flooding controversy but that
he was a public official as a result of his position of elected county surveyor. Id. at 813-14.
Noting, however, that the allegedly defamatory article made no reference to the plaintff in
his capacity as county surveyor and that his involvement in the flooding controversy had been
the result only of his duties as a consulting engineer, the court found that a factual issue
existed as to whether the article related to his official conduct or fitness for office. Id. at 814-
15.
The defendant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing
that the Texas Supreme Court's treatment of the issue constituted an erroneous reading of
Rosenblatt and was in conflict with the United States Supreme Court's own treatment of the
issue in cases before it. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, 9-10, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
Plaintiff argued that since the issue had not in fact been put to a jury this question was not
ripe for review. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 4, 21-27, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977). The court
denied the petition and thus declined the opportunity to further clarify the proper treatment
of the issue. 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
" Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Rosenblatt, commented:
Turning, then, to the question whether respondent was a "public official"
within [the meaning of] New York Times, we reject at the outset his suggestion
that it should be answered by reference to state-law standards. States have
developed definitions of "public official" for local administrative purposes, not
the purposes of a national constitutional protection. If existing state-law stan-
dards reflect the purposes of New York Times, this is at best accidental. Our
decision in New York Times, moreover, draws its force from the constitutional
protections afforded free expression. The standards that set the scope of its
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ingly national in scope, uniform treatment of the applicability of the
privilege is essential to the creation of a "breathing space" within
which the press can operate without the chilling effect of the threat
of liability for defamatory falsehood.5 5 Disparate treatment gener-
ates uncertainty, and creates a potential for inequity. A defendant
in one jurisdiction might be forced to bear the high costs of a full
trial before receiving a judgment on the merits; a similarly situated
party in another jurisdiction, however, might obtain summary dis-
position of the issue. Such a situation significantly complicates an
assessment of the risks of publication, and may result in a publisher
basing his decision to publish not on a federal rule, but rather on
how that rule is applied in the jurisdiction he considers least favora-
ble to his position, or in which his costs of defense will be greatest.
If the privilege is to function properly as an instrument of "national
constitutional protection," the rules which allocate the roles of the
judge and jury must be uniform in statement and application.
Several arguments can be made that the status of the defamed
individual as a public official or public figure, and the relevance of
the allegedly defamatory statement to that status, should be treated
as questions of fact to be decided by the jury unless reasonable
minds could not differ on their proper resolution. First, although the
common law rules cited by the Rosenblatt Court state that the
applicability of the privilege is a question of law for the judge, the
operation of these rules presents particularly fine distinctions, and
allows the judge considerable discretion in deciding which issues
reach the jury. 6 This discretion to involve the jury in resolving
difficult questions is particularly appropriate in defamation cases
since the harm the defamed person suffers is to his community
relations and the jury theoretically embodies local community val-
ues. 5 By treating the applicability of the constitutional privilege as
a question of fact, and therefore for the jury in cases where reasona-
ble minds might differ, jury resolution of difficult or doubtful privi-
lege questions is preserved.
The Court's own disposition of the privilege issue, however, does
principles cannot therefore be such that "the constitutional limits of free expres-
sion in the Nation would vary with state lines."
383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966) (footnotes and citation omitted).
New York Times wholeheartedly embraced the notion that the purpose of the privilege
was to prevent the threat of liability for libel from chilling criticism of public officials and
debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72, 278-79 (1964).
Gertz reaffirmed that purpose. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974).
11 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 115, at 796.




not support the conclusion that it intended to extend its approval
to the flexibility with which the cited common law rules were ap-
plied. In no case has the Court indicated that a jury issue might be
present either on the plaintiffs status as a public official or public
figure, or on the relevance of the allegedly defamatory statement to
that public status.18 In fact, the language of the Court strongly sug-
gests that its intention in Rosenblatt was to adopt the Restatement
formulation of the common law rule as a federal rule on the alloca-
tion of judge and jury roles in constitutional privilege cases: that is,
that the applicability of the privilege in a particular case is a matter
of law for the judge, and the question of the defendant's possible
abuse of the privilege (defined by New York Times as knowledge or
reckless disregard of falsity) is a question of fact for the jury.59
One might argue that regardless of what the Court intended in the
early days of Rosenblatt, treating the privilege issue as a question
of fact more closely conforms to the Court's recent return to the
status-based privilege announced in Gertz. In that case the Court
emphasized the individual's voluntariness in receiving media atten-
tion as an important factor distinguishing public officials and public
figures from private individuals, and thus in determining the appro-
priateness of applying the constitutional privilege." Several com-
mentators have pointed out that this emphasis can be read as a shift
away from the basic first amendment rationale toward one closely
resembling the tort doctrine of assumption of the risk. 1 If such a
reading of Gertz is correct, the application of the privilege would
11 Recent decisions have frequently resolved particularly close public figure questions. One
judge seemed to feel there was at least room for reasonable disagreement with the Court's
finding that prominent Chicago attorney Elmer Gertz was not a public figure, commenting
"perhaps if attorney Gertz was not a public figure, nobody is." Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche,
404 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Brieant, J.), rev'd, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
1, Justice Brennan's language closely tracks that of the rule in the RESTATEMENT OF TOMRT
§ 619 (1938), and specifically refers only to the issue of the defendant's knowledge or reckless
disregard of falsity as a possible jury issue. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 77, 87-88 (1966).
His further comment in a footnote that the purpose of the recommended procedure is to
guarantee the proper functioning of the privilege as aconstitutional protection, is inconsistent
with the notion that he intended to authorize the importation of the flexibility with which
the procedural rules were applied at common law. Id. at 88 n.15. Finally, both New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525
(1954), which Justice Brennan cites at the conclusion of his comment, stress the importance
of procedural rules in cases involving first amendment interests.
1" "An individual who decides to seek public governmental office must accept certain
necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public
scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. . . . Those classed as public figures stand in a
similar position. . . . [T]hey invite attention and comment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
11 E.g., Eaton, supra note 9, at 1419-20.
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involve an assessment of the subjective factors of the individual's
knowledge of the risk of defamatory harm, and his voluntariness in
exposing himself to it."2 Such assessments are generally considered
questions of fact particularly suited for jury resolution.13 If these are
the factors which determine the applicability of the constitutional
privilege, that issue should be reserved as a question of fact for the
jury.
This argument, however, both overstates the Court's reliance on
tort principles and misinterprets the Court's use of the concept of
voluntariness. While traditional tort law principles receive a more
favorable consideration in Gertz and its progeny than in previous
cases, the narrower status-based privilege retains a basis in first
amendment theory and recognizes that essentially political speech,
and the press as the disseminator of information of self-governing
importance, must be free from the chilling effect of liability for
defamatory error.8" The Court's retention of the privilege protecting
defamatory statements about the official conduct of public officials
is certainly consistent with such a view. In addition, even the
Court's new and narrower definition of public figures seems rooted
in the recognition that certain individuals outside government oc-
cupy positions of sufficient political power that statements concern-
ing them should also be included within the privilege. Thus, public
figures are defined as those who occupy positions of great((persuasive power and influence" or those who, without occupying
such positions of general power and influence, achieve political im-
portance through their active attempts to influence the resolution
of particular "public controversies." 5 These are clearly first amend-
ment considerations foreign to any tort law theory.
Moreover, while the Gertz opinion emphasizes the public officials'
and public figures' voluntary assumption of the risks of media at-
tention and the likelihood that they will have sufficient access to the
media to effectively rebut defamatory falsehoods concerning them,
Justice Powell makes clear that the Court offers these factors as a
way of distinguishing broadly between public and private persons
generally. Treatment of these matters as factual issues which must
be proved to the satisfaction of a jury before application of the
52 While knowledge of the risk and voluntariness in assuming it are the basic elements of
the assumption of the risk defense, its form varies substantially and it has been the subject
of considerable debate and criticism. See W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 68.
93 Id. at 455; 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2728, at 553
(1973).
" See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974).
62 Id. at 345.
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privilege seems clearly contrary to Justice Powell's statement that
the Court is announcing "broad rules of general application...
[which] necessarily treat alike various cases involving differences
as well as similarities." 6
Treating the applicability of the privilege as a question of fact
presents several other serious drawbacks. While there certainly
would be cases in which the plaintiff's status and the relevance of
the allegedly defamatory statement clearly falls inside or outside
the scope of the privilege, the number of cases in which reasonable
minds might differ on the issue is potentially quite large. This is
especially true in public figure cases, where a relatively large
amount of factual data may be presented concerning the individ-
ual's activities and the circumstances surrounding them."7 This fac-
tual data is quite likely to support conflicting inferences about
whether the elements of the public figure standard are satisfied.
While a significantly large number of cases would go to the jury
under this approach, jury resolution of the applicability of the privi-
lege has considerable disadvantages. First, jury resolution of the
issue in a particular case is less predictable than a decision by the
court. A jury would have no guidance as to what factors might have
influenced past juries in similar cases. Rather, it would be guided
only by the instructions of the judge on the requirements of the
applicable standard. It is difficult to imagine what such instructions
might contain, other than some of the often-quoted language of the
Court on the subject of who is a public official or public figure. This
language is notably vague, and by itself would offer little guidance
for or control over the jury's decision." Second, since jury decisions
" Id. at 343-44. Justice Powell notes also that "it is often true that not all of the considera-
tions which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each particular case decided under
its authority," id. at 344, and that "[e]ven if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every
instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public offi-
cials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehood concerning them," id. at 345 (emphasis added).
41 Resolution of the public figure issue will often involve consideration of the plaintiff's
activities and speech over a considerable period of time as well as a broad range of data
concerning the historical, political and social context in which that behavior took place. In
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977), affl'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), reu'd, 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979), for example, the trial court and appellate court
considered plaintiff Wolston's entire life history in reaching their decisions that Wolston was
properly deemed a public figure. The United States Supreme Court held that Wolston was
not a public figure but did not indicate that such an expansive range of facts was not relevant
in determining the public figure issue.
" Both judges and commentators have found the Court's language difficult to apply. See
note 21 supra. It is submitted that jurors, without the opportunity to sift through the reported
cases and consider the particular facts and nuances of the various statements of the standard,
would be at a substantially greater disadvantage. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578
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would have no binding effect on future juries considering similarly
fine distinctions, they would not contribute to the development and
refinement of the scope of the privilege. Although some refinement
would be provided in appellate opinions, 9 the essence of this ap-
proach would necessitate the affirmance of a reasonable jury deci-
sion, even though that decision might conflict with another jury
decision in a factually similar case. As a consequence, there would
develop a category of cases, perhaps quite broad, within which ap-
plicability of the privilege would be solely within the discretion of
the jury.
Moreover, such an approach provides little protection against the
possibility that the application of the privilege will depend on the
popularity of the individuals or ideas involved in just those cases
where that danger is greatest. It is unlikely that a responsible deci-
sionmaker will allow personal bias or opinion to influence his deci-
sion on the applicability of the privilege in cases where the defama-
tory statement is clearly inside or outside the scope of the privilege;
should that occur, an appellate court could easily detect the opera-
tion of that bias and overturn the decision. The danger that such
extraneous factors will play a subtle role in influencing the decision-
maker is much greater in cases where the applicability of the privi-
lege presents a particularly close question, capable of differing but
nonetheless rational conclusions about its proper outcome. Treat-
ment of the applicability of the privilege as a question of fact, how-
ever, calls for jury resolution of the privilege issue in just such close
cases. Furthermore, under this approach, an appellate court would
be compelled to affirm any reasonable jury decision. As a conse-
quence, effective appellate review will be foreclosed in exactly those
areas where constitutional protection of unpopular ideas and their
advocates is most sorely needed.70
Treatment of the applicability of the privilege as a matter of law
F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S.Ct. 2701 (1979).
11 Treatment of the applicability of the privilege as a question of fact does not mean that
jury decisions on the issue would be completely beyond judicial control. The Court has
determined that jury decisions on the issue of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity are
"constitutional factfinding," and therefore subject to de novo review by appellate courts. New
York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). Should the applicability of the privilege
be treated as a question of fact, de novo review of jury factfinding on this issue would no doubt
also be found necessary.
70 Under the question of fact approach, the privilege issue would go the jury when reasona-
ble minds might differ on its outcome. While special findings might reveal whether the jury
had applied the privilege and therefore whether it had applied the proper standard of fault,
it would continue to be impossible for a trial or appellate court to detect the operation of jury
prejudice concerning the ideas or personalities involved in the case which may have influ-
enced the jury's decision on the application of the privilege.
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avoids many of these difficulties. Under this approach questions of
the status of the defamed individual as a public official or public
figure and the relevance of the defamatory statement to that public
status are to be decided by the judge on the basis of objective facts
about the individual's position or course of conduct, and the text of
the defamatory statement.7 Since these objective facts will not be
disputed in most cases, this approach will result in earlier resolution
of the privilege issue, and in many cases earlier resolution of the case
itself.7" This early disposition may mean saving the substantial costs
of trial for both parties and will lessen the degree to which these
costs alone might lead to self-censorship by publishers.3
In addition, treatment of the applicability of the privilege as a
matter of law will increase certainty and render more accurate pre-
diction of which individuals and which statements about them are
protected by the constitutional privilege. As cases are decided and
appealed, the scope of the privilege will achieve greater refinement
and definition in appellate opinions. While this process will take
place over time, there also will be greater short term predictability,
since a judge in a particular case will most likely attempt to reach
a reasoned decision which is logically consistent with other reported
decisions. 74 Thus constrained by stare decisis a judge's decision is
less likely to be the product of sentiment concerning the individuals
or ideas involved in the case.75
71 Of course, if these underlying objective facts, such as the government position held by
the plaintiff and his duties, or the activities of a potential public figure, were in dispute,
resolution of these issues would be within the province of the jury.
72 No case has been found in which the facts concerning the plaintiff's public position or
activity were disputed. In fact, in the vast majority of cases the applicability of the privilege
is decided on motion for summary judgment.
11 The costs of a full trial in a libel case are high and the possibility of incurring them has
been argued to deter publishers from printing statements the truth of which they cannot
conclusively prove. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 435-36.
1, See Comment, supra note 10, at 1152-55.
11 It may be argued, however, that judges, no less than jurors, are subject to the influence
of their own prejudice and opinions. In fact, judges have seemed particularly unsympathetic
to defamation plaintiffs and quite ready to resolve close questions on the applicability of the
privilege in favor of defendants. See note 13 supra. To the extent that this remains true,
placing the question of the applicability of the privilege exclusively in the hands of judges
may result in a greater degree of protection for the publishers of defamatory falsehoods than
the Court presently considers necessary or appropriate, and a corresponding decrease in the
protection of the valid reputational interests of individuals. Given the clear direction of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions narrowing the scope of the privilege, however, it




The United States Supreme Court has directly addressed the pro-
per roles for the judge and jury in applying the constitutional privi-
lege only once in Rosenblatt v. Baer. While most lower courts con-
tinue to cite Rosenblatt for authority on the issue, the cases evi-
dence a growing lack of uniformity and uncertainty about the proper
treatment of the privilege question.
The Court itself has never found a jury issue to be present on the
applicability of the privilege even in arguably close cases; nor do its
recent decisions, which narrow the scope of the privilege and evi-
dence a greater regard for the reputational interests of private indi-
viduals, support the conclusion that the Court considers the appli-
cability of the privilege to be a question for jury resolution. Treat-
ment of the applicability of the privilege as a question of law for the
court is thus the most likely choice of the Court should it squarely
face this issue. Furthermore, such treatment better achieves the
purposes for which the constitutional privilege was created. Treat-
ment of the privilege issue as a question of fact would create a
potentially large category of cases within which the application of
the privilege would be at the sole discretion of the jury, and within
which the popularity or unpopularity of the parties and ideas in-
volved would be most likely to influence the jury's decision. Treat-
ment of the applicability of the privilege as a question of law for the
judge, however, would provide greater predictability of results, ear-
lier resolution of the issue in most cases, and in many cases a sub-
stantial decrease in litigation costs. All of these consequences reduce
the likelihood that the threat of liability for defamatory falsehood
will unduly burden constitutionally protected speech.
CHRISTOPHER G. SCANLON
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